SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses
of recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners.In so doing,
we hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreastof some of
the more interesting changes in significantareas of practice.
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ACTIONS AND DEFENSES-VIOLATION
LATION DOES NOT

GIVE RISE

OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGU-

TO IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

DAMAGEs-Jalowiecki v. Leuc, 182 N.J. Super. 22, 440 A.2d 21
(App. Div. 1981).
Edward and Sharon Jalowiecki entered into a contract to purchase a house on May 31, 1977. They had visited the property many
times, and prior to the closing they inspected the property thoroughly.
Their inspections failed to reveal any problems with the septic system,
and no signs of flooding in the basement or backyard were observed.
182 N.J. Super. at 24, 440 A.2d at 22. The vendor, Hugo Leuc,
provided them with the original permit for the septic system, which
contained a diagram of the system's layout. He also provided various
information in response to inquiries by the Jalowieckis. Id., 440 A.2d
at 23.
After taking possession of the house on August 4, 1977, the Jalowieckis began to experience problems with the septic system. The
toilet and drainpipe in the basement overflowed, and water began to
seep up through the ground in the backyard when the drain was
capped to prevent flooding. The Jalowieckis made several attempts to
cure the water seepage problem, all of which failed. Finally, the
problem was remedied by removing the swimming pool, which was
located over the drainage area for the septic system in violation of N.J.
ADMIN. CODE

tit. 7, § 9-2.22 (Supp. 1978), in order to create a new

disposal area. 182 N.J. Super. at 25, 440 A.2d at 23. The vendor
claimed that he had never experienced any trouble with the septic
system, and the Jalowieckis testified that they never felt he was trying
to hide or withhold anything prior to the closing. Id. at 26, 440 A.2d
at 23.
The Jaowieckis filed a complaint against Leuc alleging a violation of the Standards for Construction of Individual Subsurface Sewage Disposal Systems, N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, §§ 9-2.2 to -2.98
(Supp. 1978), and a "knowing and intentional misrepresentation and
concealment of material facts." 182 N.J. Super. at 24, 440 A.2d at 22.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's actions with prejudice, id. at
23, 440 A.2d at 23, and the appellate division affirmed. Id. at 33, 440
A.2d at 22.
Dealing first with the issue of whether the adverse judgment
regarding the cause of action based upon misrepresentation and concealment was against the weight of the evidence, Judge Michels held
that the trial court's findings were amply supported by the evidence.
Id. at 26, 440 A.2d at 24. The central issue, however, concerned
whether a cause of action for damages could be implied from an
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administrative regulation. Noting that the regulation only provided
for penalties and injunctive relief, Judge Michels concluded that no
private cause of action could be implied either "from the statutory
scheme involved or the administrative regulations promulgated thereunder." Id. at 28, 440 A.2d at 24.
In support of its holding, the court relied upon Osback v. Township of Lyndhurst, 7 N.J. 371, 81 A.2d 721 (1951), which held that the
failure of a municipality to comply with a statute does not create a
private cause of action against it absent the explicit creation of such an
action by the statute. 182 N.J. Super. at 28-29, 440 A.2d at 25.
Recognizing that this rigid rule might have been modified over the last
thirty years, the court examined the factors set forth in Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975), for determining when a cause of action should be
implied. 182 N.J. Super. at 29, 440 A.2d at 25. First, the court
reasoned that the plaintiffs were not of the particular "class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted." Id.. at 31, 440 A.2d at 26.
The statutory scheme under consideration was aimed at protecting the
environment for the public at large, not for any single individual or
group. With respect to the second Cort v. Ash factor, the court noted
that there was no explicit indication of a legislative intent to either
create or deny a private cause of action. Nevertheless, Judge Michels
reasoned that the legislature "was primarily concerned with expedited
agency enforcement of the Act," and that a private remedy would
impede this goal. Id. at 32, 440 A.2d at 27. Similarly, with respect to
the third factor, Judge Michels reasoned that an implied cause of
action would not be consistent with the purpose of the legislation
because protracted civil litigation would not be as effective as the
summary proceedings provided for in carrying out the aim of the Act.
Id. at 32-33, 440 A.2d at 27. Finally, the court noted that the fourth
Cort v. Ash factor, namely, whether the action is one traditionally
relegated to state law, was not applicable to a state regulation or
statute. Id. at 33, 440 A.2d at 27.
As the first New Jersey case in nearly thirty years to deal with the
issue of implied causes of action, Jalowiecki is significant in that it
makes clear that New Jersey courts are loath to read private causes of
action into statutes or regulations. This is as it should be, as it could be
argued that to do otherwise would be a usurpation of legislative
power.
P.L.G.
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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE-PLAINTIFF's

NEGLIGENCE MUST

BE

COMPARED TO NEGLIGENCE OF MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS ON INDIVID-

BASIS- VanHorn v. William Blanchard Co., 88 N.J. 91, 438
A.2d 552 (1981).
UAL

On September 25, 1975, while seeking cover in a rain storm on
the construction site where he was working, Lloyd VanHorn slipped,
fell, and was injured. He brought an action for negligence against
three defendants: the general contractor, William Blanchard Company, a subcontractor, Epic Construction Company, and an employee of Epic, Hull.
In response to special interrogatories, the jury apportioned negligence among the parties. Plaintiff VanHorn was found to be fiftypercent negligent. Defendants Blanchard and Epic were found to be
thirty-percent and twenty-percent negligent, respectively; defendant
Hull was absolved of any negligence. Because the plaintiff's negligence was greater than that of either defendant taken individually,
the trial court held for the defendants. 88 N.J. at 93, 438 A.2d at 553.
Plaintiff asserted on appeal to the appellate division that since his
negligence did not exceed the aggregate negligence of the two defendants he should prevail. A majority of the appellate division upheld the
trial court's decision. 173 N.J. Super. 280, 414 A.2d 265 (1980). Judge
Pressler, dissenting, disagreed with prior holdings in New Jersey
which, following the Wisconsin courts' interpretation of that state's
prototypic comparative negligence statute, construed the statute as
requiring the individual comparison approach. As Judge Pressler indicated, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was now questioning the individual approach to comparative negligence. Id. at 288, 414 A.2d at
269 (Pressler, J., dissenting). The plaintiff appealed as of right to the
New Jersey Supreme Court, which in affirming the appellate division
by a four-to-three majority held that the negligence of the plaintiff
must be measured against the negligence of multiple defendants on an
individual basis. 88 N.J. at 95, 438 A.2d at 556.
The Comparative Negligence Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 15-5.1
to 5.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982), was enacted to remove the bar
to recovery that plaintiffs experienced under the doctrine of contributory negligence. In the majority opinion, Justice Clifford interpreted
the statutory language to proscribe comparison of the negligence of
the plaintiff to the aggregate negligence of the defendants. The court
construed the statutory designation of a defendant as "the person," see
id. § 2A: 15-5.1, to denote singularity, so that only the negligence of an
individual defendant could be compared to that of the plaintiff. 88
N.J. at 95, 438 A.2d at 554.
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The majority found that section 3 of the statute, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:15-5.3, clearly embraced the situation involving multiple defendants by providing that the plaintiff may recover the full judgment
from a single defendant, even if barred from recovering from others
who are negligent. Justice Clifford characterized this section as the
"antithesis of aggregating all the defendants' negligence." 88 N.J. at
95-96, 438 A.2d at 555. Justice Clifford conjectured that Wisconsin's
possible movement toward an aggregate approach was merely "a
momentary aberration," and the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
clearly determined to leave the possibility of a plaintiff recovering
from a defendant less negligent than himself for the legislature to
address. Id. at 97, 438 A.2d at 556. He considered it to be the
"unmistakable preference" of the New Jersey Legislature that the
question of comparative negligence be approached on an individualized basis. Any deviation from that position would have to originate
with the legislature itself. Id. at 98, 438 A.2d at 556.
Justice Handler, dissenting, would have permitted a plaintiff
whose negligence is not greater than fifty-percent to recover; negligent defendants would contribute to the judgment according to the
percentage assigned to each of them. Id. at 99, 438 A.2d at 556-57
(Handler, J., dissenting). The dissent declared that the intention of
the legislature is unclear from the language of the Comparative Negligence Act. He concurred with Judge Pressler in her view that to elicit
the legislative intent, one must "go beyond the terms of the statute
itself." Id. at 100, 438 A.2d at 557 (Handler, J., dissenting). Reference
must be made to the statutory guidelines in N.J. STAT. ANN § 1:1-2
(West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982), which provides that any word implying a singular number will also apply to several persons or parties. 88
N.J. at 100-01, 438 A.2d at 557-58 (Handler, J., dissenting). To
construe the phrase "the person against whom recovery is sought" as
pertaining "to the tortfeasor concept in its collective and adjectival
sense" does no violence to the purpose of the Act. Id. at 101, 438 A.2d
at 558 (Handler, J., dissenting). The dissent suggested that the court
should have abandoned its efforts at language interpretation; instead,
it should have initiated a "deeper probe" to ascertain legislative intent. Id. at 102-03, 438 A.2d at 558 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Additionally, the dissent rejected the majority's assumption that
because the comparative negligence statute in New Jersey was modeled after the Wisconsin statute, the judicial interpretation of the
statute must be identical. The record indicated that the legislature
studied the law of several other jurisdictions, some of which have
adopted the aggregate approach to comparative negligence. Id. at
104, 438 A.2d at 559 (Handler, J., dissenting).
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Of paramount significance is New Jersey's tort law history and
the legal traditions that finally dictated the abolition of contributory
negligence because it barred an injured and negligent plaintiff from
any recovery. A plaintiff who is forty-percent negligence can recover
from a single defendant who is sixty-percent negligent. Under the
majority's individual approach, however, a plaintiff would not recover if, instead, he was injured by three twenty-percent negligent
defendants. By making plaintiff's recovery dependent upon the number of defendants brought into a suit, the court has revived the unfair
result of contributory negligence. The inequity reaches defendants
who, if less negligent than plaintiff, are able to escape all liability,
leaving another defendant to pay the entire judgment. Id. at 106-07,
438 A.2d at 560-61 (Handler, J., dissenting).
The method of distributing responsibility among all negligent
defendants, as provided by the aggregate approach, is a more fitting
solution for all concerned. The obvious effect of the individual approach conjures up visions of the same gross inequities that plaintiffs
suffered under the outdated doctrine of contributory negligence.
These recollections and the potential for abuse of the single controversy doctrine should readily convince the legislature to attempt another rescue of the aggregate approach to comparative negligence.
A.W.H.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-EMPLOYER MAY
DISCHARGE NON-CIVIL SERVICE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE WITH POLICY-MAKING AND CONFIDENTIALITY JOB RESPONSIBILITIES ON BASIS OF

AFFILIATIN-Battaglia v. Union County Welfare
Board, 88 N.J. 48, 438 A.2d 530 (1981).
PARTISAN

Plaintiff, attorney Thomas Battaglia, was employed as a parttime legal assistant for the defendant, Union County Welfare Board,
for a one-year term. 88 N.J. at 53, 438 A.2d at 533. Upon expiration
of the term, the Board declined to reappoint the plaintiff. Id. at 54,
438 A.2d at 533. Instead, it followed the recommendation of the
Union County Democratic chairman, who objected to the reappointment because Battaglia had opposed the chairman's re-election. The
plaintiff sued for reinstatement on two grounds, asserting that as a

tenured employee under N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 44:7-9 (West Cum. Supp.

1981-1982), he could only be dismissed following a hearing and finding of "just cause," and claiming that the Board had fired him in
violation of his first amendment right to political expression. 88 N.J.
at 53, 438 A.2d at 533.
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The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 54, 438 A.2d at 533. While agreeing with the trial court's
determination that plaintiffs position was not tenured, the appellate
division reversed and remanded on the first amendment issue based on
its reading of the United States Supreme Court's intervening decision
in Bronti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). The remand was to determine whether the discharge was solely politically motivated and, if so,
whether political affiliation was a proper job requirement. 88 N.J. at
54-55, 438 A.2d at 533-34. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted
defendant's certification petition and the plaintiff's cross-petition. Id.
at 53, 438 A.2d at 533. In reinstating the dismissal, the supreme court
agreed with the trial court determinations that plaintiff lacked the
protection of a tenured position and that the Board's discharge for
political reasons was within its discretion because the position required that the attorney implement policies and maintain a confidential relationship with the Board. Id. at 55, 67, 438, A.2d at 534, 540.
The court first dismissed Battaglia's assertion that N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 44:7-9 entitled him to a tenured position during good behavior, subject to removal only for just cause. 88 N.J. at 55, 438 A.2 at
534. The court noted that if a county such as Union elects civil service
coverage, the statute operates to exclude legal counsel from the protected classified status. Moreover, the court emphasized that at trial
plaintiff had acknowledged his unclassified status, signed documents
to that effect, and did not challenge the county personnel director's
statement that the status was unclassified. Id. at 56, 438 A.2d at 534.
Considering whether Battaglia's termination deprived him of a
property interest without due process, the court found that as an "at
will" employee, he lacked statutory or contractual job protection and,
thus, did not possess a property interest in his position. Id. at 57-58,
438 A.2d at 535. Furthermore, Battaglia was not denied a liberty
interest because under the amended civil service regulation he was not
disqualified from future public employment since his dismissal resulted from neither delinquency nor misconduct. Id. at 57-58, 438
A.2d at 535.
In determining whether the plaintiff could prevail on his central
claim, his first amendment right to political expression, the court
evaluated the United States Supreme Court's opinions in Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1967) and Branti. Elrod invalidated political
firings of public employees whose duties did not involve confidential,
policy-making functions. 88 N.J. at 58-59, 438 A.2d at 535-36. Patronage dismissals for policy-making positions, however, were sanctioned upon the compelling state interest of allowing an administration to remove an employee whose views might obstruct implementation of a new governmental policy. According to the New Jersey
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high court, the Supreme Court's later decision in Branti "refined" the
policy that "a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential public employee
could not lawfully be discharged solely because of his political beliefs." Id. at 60, 438 A.2d at 536. Branti enjoined a newly appointed
public defender from discharging assistant public defenders holding
different political beliefs. The court reasoned that party affiliation
was not necessary to the job, that the position was comprised of no
confidentiality or policy-making components, and that political determinations may impair the effective discharge of a public defender's
duties. Id. at 61, 438 A.2d at 537. The New Jersey Supreme Court,
however, interpreted Branti as reaffirming the principle that a nontenured government lawyer is subject to dismissal if the position's
confidential, policy-making duties are "compromised because of a
difference in political commitment." Id. at 62, 438 A.2d at 537.
The New Jersey court applied the Elrod and Branti formulations
to determine whether political association was a proper qualification
for the position of attorney to a county welfare board. Id. at 63, 438
A.2d at 538. The court examined the job description of legal counsel
delineated in the welfare regulations. Rejecting Battaglia's assertion
that as legal assistant he did not perform policy-making functions in a
confidential capacity, the court found that the Board may call upon
the legal assistant to perform the same functions as counsel. Unlike a
public defender who represents individual clients, Battaglia represented the Board. That body was entitled to repose trust and confidence regarding policy-making communications in its staff attorneys.
Id. at 64, 438 A.2d at 538. It is also appropriate to require the
attorney or the legal assistant to have a political philosophy compatible with his client, the Board. Id. at 65, 438 A.2d at 539. The
responsibilities of a legal assistant also include policy implementation
and are thus subject to the same party affiliation job requirements as
the legal counsel. The court found as a matter of law that plaintiff's
political association was a factor contributing to the effective performance of his job. Therefore, the trial court's summary judgment dismissal was correct. Id. at 67, 438 A.2d at 540.
Justice Pollock's dissent, joined by Justice Clifford, asserted that
summary judgment dismissal was inappropriate because a finding of
fact was required to determine whether the Board had met its burden
of showing that political affiliation was a necessary requirement of
plaintiff's position. Id. at 72, 438 A.2d at 543 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
It was also necessary to evaluate the Board's structure and duties. The
dissent implied that since the legislature apparently intended to minimize political control of the Board, it was illogical to sanction the
politically motivated dismissal of a Board employee. Id. at 70-71, 438
A.2d at 542 (Pollock, J. dissenting).
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In Battaglia, the court clarified the application of the Supreme
Court's policy-making and confidentiality criteria in non-classified
public employment, finding that those criteria, though not conclusive,
contributed to a final determination that partisan association could
cause ineffective job performance. The court focused upon the job
description in evaluating whether political affiliation was a valid
requirement. Although an official may not in fact be implementing
policy or performing confidential tasks, nevertheless under Battaglia
he may be subject to dismissal on the basis of political association.
M.S.M.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEoOM OF

SPEECH-MUNICIPAL ORDI-

NANCES PROSCRIBING LIVE NUDE DANCING BY DIRECT AND INDIRECT

MEANS

VIOLATIVE

OF DUE

PROCESS AND

EQUAL

PROTECTION

CLAUSEs-Trombetta v. City of Atlantic City, 181 N.J. Super.
203, 436 A.2d 1349 (Law Div. 1981).
Plaintiff Robert Trombetta, the owner of an "adult" bookstore in
the central business district of Atlantic City, applied for municipal
licenses allowing him to install booths featuring live nude dancers into
his "peep show" operations. 181 N.J. Super. at 216, 436 A.2d at 1355.
The application was first denied on the basis of a newly enacted city
ordinance that prohibited nudity in private business establishments
that were open to the public. See City of Atlantic City, N.J., Ordinance No. 28 (March 31, 1980); 181 N.J. Super. at 217, 436 A.2d at
1355-56. After several unsuccessful attempts at negotiation with the
City Solicitor, Trombetta initiated in the law division an action in lieu
of prerogative writ in which he attacked the constitutionality of the
ordinance on the ground, inter alia, that it was a prior restraint upon
his first amendment right to free speech, and thereby denied to him a
liberty protected by the due process clause. The plaintiff also sought
an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance and an order
requiring the city to issue the requested licenses. Id. at 217-18, 436
A.2d at 1356.
At a hearing held pursuant to the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, the defendant city introduced the argument that its action
was also supported by another ordinance that empowered certain city
agencies to refuse a license on public welfare and morals grounds.
City of Atlantic City, N.J., Ordinance No. 37 (1977); 181 N.J. Super.
at 218, 436 A.2d at 1356. At yet another hearing, the city cited a
provision of the Atlantic City Municipal Land Use Ordinance, see id.
at 218-19, 436 A.2d at 1356 (citation omitted), by which all live
entertainment was prohibited in the central business district except in
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restaurants. Id. at 219, 436 A.2d at 1356. After reargument of the
summary judgment motion, the law division, per Judge Gruccio,
declared each of the three ordinances unconstitutional, enjoined their
enforcement, and ordered the city to issue to the plaintiff the licenses
he had requested. Id. at 252, 436 A.2d at 1375.
After examining several preliminary questions-the scope of judicial review, justiciability requirements, and the legitimate power of
the legislature to enact laws for the public good-id. at 219-27, 436
A.2d at 1357-61, the court noted that the allocation of the burden of
persuasion was difficult in this case because of the shifting bases of the
city's action. It concluded that while municipal ordinances are normally presumed constitutional, that presumption is inverted when the
regulation in question impinges upon rights guaranteed by the first
amendment. Id. at 227-29, 436 A.2d at 1361-62.
The court began its constitutional analysis by noting that the first
amendment guarantee of free speech embraces expressive conduct. Id.
at 229, 436 A.2d at 1362. That guarantee, moreover, binds the states
and, by extension, municipalities through the protection of liberty
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 229-30, 436 A.2d at 1362. The court examined the
ordinances in question separately, for each amounted to "municipal
interference with liberty" in a distinct way. Id. at 230, 436 A.2d at
1362-63.
Ordinance No. 28, which prohibited nudity in private establishments, was viewed as a direct suppression of the protected right of
expression. The ordinance directly regulated the content of an expressive activity and thus contravened the principle that legislation which
implicates first amendment interests must be applied in a contentneutral fashion. Id. at 231, 436 A.2d at 1363. The court relied upon
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), for the
proposition that live nude dancing is a constitutionally protected form
of expression. 181 N.J. Super. at 231-32, 436 A.2d at 1363. And
although obscenity is an exception to the rule prohibiting the infringement of free expression, the court held that simple nudity is not
obscene. Id. at 232, 436 A.2d at 1363.
The court then held that the land use ordinance, though ostensibly directed at the regulation of noncommunicative activity, selectively intruded upon expressive activity. Id. at 233, 436 A.2d at 136465. The land use ordinance violated the equal protection clause by
barring the plaintiff's access to a fundamental right-expression-that
was otherwise granted to members of another class. Id. at 234-35, 436
A.2d at 1364-65. Furthermore, the city failed to show that it could
achieve legitimate ends through a more narrowly drawn statute. The
court also noted that the zoning ordinance bore no rational relation-
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ship to a legitimate municipal concern. Id. at 235-37, 436 A.2d at
1365.
Under Ordinance No. 37, the public welfare ordinance, the municipality censored expressive activity by "deliberate omission," i.e.,
by failing to promptly review the plaintiff's applications. Id. at 230,
436 A.2d at 1363. Examining the possible abuse of official discretion,
the court noted that the opponents of the plaintiff's request failed to
adduce any evidence that the proposed operations would have a detrimental effect upon Atlantic City. Id. at 245, 436 A.2d at 1371. The
court further found that the circumstances of the first amendment in
this area was not justified as a means to protect minors, regulate
traffic, or as based on neighbors' opinions of the character of the area.
Id. 246-50, 436 A.2d at 1371-73.
Finally, the court held that the "bartering procedure" by which
an applicant must appeal to the discretion of the licensing authority
violated procedural due process. Id. at 230, 250-52, 436 A.2d at 1363,
1374. Any legislation that results in a prior restraint of first amendment freedoms must, at a minimum, be implemented by narrow and
definite standards, not left to the unprincipled discretion of a municipal official. Id. at 250, 436 A.2d at 1374.
The Trombetta decision is a relatively straightforward application of the Schad case. Despite the court's declaration that it was
limiting its decision to "this municipality, at this time," id. at 252, 436
A.2d at 1374, it appears that nude entertainment of the plaintiff's
variety is now a protected activity. Nevertheless, it is interesting that
the court found that the municipal land use ordinance bore no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental end. Id. at 235, 436
A.2d at 1365. Having a rational relationship is a prerequisite of all
legislation, not just that involving fundamental rights. E.g., Board of
Health v. New York CentralRailroad, 4 N.J. 293, 302, 72 A.2d 511.
515 (1950). Thus, it was unnecessary for the law division to strictly
scrutinize this ordinance.
w.J.v.
CRIMINAL

LAW-WITNESSES-CONFRONTATION

TO TESTIFY NOT "TESTIMONY"

CLAUSE-REFUSAL

FOR PURPOSE OF ADMISSIBILITY OF

PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS-State

Williams, 182 N.J. Su-

per. 427, 442 A.2d 620 (App. Div. 1982).

The Hudson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant Gary
Williams and charged him with seven counts of felony murder, one
count of arson, and one count of possession of an incendiary substance
for an unlawful purpose. Another indictment by the same grand jury
charged Kevin Madison with the same offenses. Both indictments
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were returned as the result of an investigation into a fire of suspicious
orgin in Jersey City, New Jersey. The police investigation revealed
that Madison may have been involved or may have had information
concerning the crimes. After questioning, Madison gave to the investigating officers a signed statement which detailed his and Williams'
involvement in the fires. A jury subsequently convicted Madison of
seven counts of felony murder and one count of arson. He then
appealed those convictions. 182 N.J. Super. at 430, 442 A.2d at 621.
At the pretrial conference prior to defendant Williams' trial, the
State announced that it intended to call Madison as a prosecution
witness and indicated that it would grant Madison immunity for the
use of his testimony. To determine the admissibility of Madison's
statement as substantive evidence, the trial judge held a pretrial hearing. After being called and sworn to this hearing, Madison asserted his
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to
answer any questions concerning the fire. Id. at 430-31, 442 A.2d at
621. After a ruling by the trial judge that the privilege was properly
asserted, the state obtained an order granting Madison immunity.
When he was recalled and questioned, Madison again asserted his
fifth amendment privilege. The trial judge ordered Madison to answer
after informing him that he no longer had any privilege.
The state sought to admit Madison's initial statement into evidence as a prior inconsistent statement. The trial judge ruled that this
statement was inadmissible on two grounds. First, he found that
Madison's present refusal to testify, while inconsistent with his prior
statement, could not be deemed "testimony" under N.J. R. EVID.
63(1)(a). Second, the trial judge held that the use of Madison's statement along with his refusal to answer questions would deny defendant
Williams of his constitutional right to the confrontation of witnesses
against him. The state appealed this ruling and the appellate division,
in an unanimous decision, affirmed.
Initially, the appellate court noted that Madison's out-of-court
statement was hearsay and that it was inadmissible unless it fit into
one of the recognized hearsay exceptions. The state argued that Madison's refusal to testify was "testimony" under N.J. R. EVID. 63(1) and,
therefore, the prior statement was admissible. 182 N.J. Super. at 431,
442 A.2d at 662. The court rejected this argument, holding that
"testimony" is "a particular kind of evidence that comes to a tribunal
through live witnesses speaking under oath or affirmation in the presence of a tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial." Id. at 432, 442 A.2d at
662. The court ruled that Madison's refusal to answer questions did
not fit this definition. The appellate court went to great lengths in
order to distinguish this case from their previous decision in State v.
Provet, 133 N.J. Super. 432, 337 A.2d 374 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
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68 N.J. 174, 343 A.2d 462 (1975). In Provet, a rape victim altered her
testimony during cross-examination and the trial court instructed the
jury that such inconsistency could be used only to evaluate her credibility. The appellate division held that the inconsistency could be
found admissible as substantive proof of a negative proposition. Id. at
437-38, 337 A.2d at 377. The Williams court distinguished Provet by
holding that silence could not be considered the equivalent of an
omission of material fact.
The court next considered the defendant's right to confrontation
of witnesses as provided by the sixth amendment. 182 N.J. Super. at
434, 442 A.2d at 624. After a lengthy review of federal precedent, the
court concluded that the statements by Madison lacked "sufficient
'indicia of reliability' to satisfy the concept underlying the constitutional right to confrontation." Id. at 438, 442 A.2d at 626. Finally,
the court found Madison's statement inadmissible because it was not
subjected to cross-examination at the time it was given and Williams
would not be able to cross-examine Madison at a trial because of
Madison's continued refusal to testify. Id., 442 A.2d at 625-26.
The decision of the Williams court reflects the continuing adherence of the courts of New Jersey to a liberal view of a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights. In an era when federal courts are
decidedly narrow in their interpretation of constitutional rights and
privileges, decisions such as Williams stand out as refreshing examples
of a state court's willingness to break with federal trends when the
proper situation presents itself.
P.W.F.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-NEw

JERSEY RErAINS RULE OF AUTO-

MATIC STANDING-State v. Alston,

88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311

(1981).
While pursuing a car driven at excessive speed, Bergen County
police detectives saw three of the occupants apparently trying to
conceal an object. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officers requested
vehicle identification papers from the driver, defendant Aston. Alston
opened the glove compartment to search for the credentials, whereupon three shotgun shells were exposed to the detectives' plain view.
The occupants were asked to exit the vehicle and were subjected to a
"'pat down" frisk. One officer entered the car to retrieve the shotgun
shells and in so doing observed an opaque bag, which upon examination was found to contain a sawed-off shotgun. The occupants were
placed under arrest, advised of their rights, and handcuffed. The car
was searched further and found to contain two handguns. The four
arrestees were charged with unlawful possession and carrying weap-
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ons under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:151-41 (West 1968). 88 N.J. at 216,
440 A.2d at 1313-14.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to suppress all
three weapons. The appellate division reversed the supression of the
shotgun, holding that the legitimate discovery of shotgun shells was
sufficient probable cause to remove the occupants from the car, to
conduct the search that revealed an object that appeared to be a
weapon, and to further determine that it was a weapon. The appellate court affirmed the suppression of the handguns based upon a
holding in State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 397 A.2d 1062 (1979), that
exigent circumstances allowing a warrantless search are dissipated
upon the arrest and physical restraint of the vehicle's occupants. The
New Jersey Supreme Court granted the state's motion to appeal the
suppression of the two revolvers but denied defendants' cross motion
to appeal the appellate division's reversal of the order suppressing the
shotgun. 88 N.J. at 217, 440 A.2d at 1314.
The court readily disposed of the suppression issue holding that
the warrantless search of defendants' automobile was well within the
exceptions doctrines established by Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1975) and Carrollv. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and thus
limited Ercolano to its own particular and distinct circumstances. The
court, however, noted that "important questions in the administration
of criminal justice in this state" were also raised in the case. The New
Jersey Attorney General as amicus curiae argued that the defendants
lacked the legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle itself and the particular areas searched necessary to confer "standing" to challenge the warrantless search as a violation of their personal
rights under the fourth amendment. Despite the defendants objection
to the supreme court's consideration of the issue, which was not raised
in the appellate division, the court chose to fully address the standing
issue. This choice was predicated upon the court's recognition that the
Attorney General's position was based upon recent United States Supreme Court decisions that eliminated the prior rule of automatic
standing which allowed defendants in possessory offenses to contest
unlawful search and seizures. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
83 (1980) (expressly overruling Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960) and rendering Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968)
essentially meaningless).
The earlier assault on automatic standing in the federal courts
began in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), a case similar to
Alston. In Rakas, the Court eliminated one of Jones' primary underpinnings for standing, that standing was automatically conferred
upon a party legitimately within the premises searched. Id. at 149.
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Salvucci completed the elimination of automatic standing begun in
Rakas. Standing to contest an unlawful search, as evolved in Rakas
and Salvucci, is dependent upon the defendants reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. Possessory interest in the property seized is not on its own sufficient to confer standing.
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not adopt the new federal
view. Rather than adopting the amorphous case-by-case analysis of
the "expectation of privacy" standard, the court retained the "automatic standing" doctrine for defendants accused of possessory offenses. Retention of the more liberal rule provided yet another example of New Jersey affording its citizens greater personal freedoms than
those required by the federal constitution. See generally Brennan,
State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv.
L. REV. 489 (1977). The state may grant its citizens such rights by
either expansive interpretation of the minimum federal mandate or by
recognition of its own constitution as an independent and "cognate
source" of such rights. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 553-60, 423 A.2d
615, 624-30 (1980).
The holding in Alston on the merits of the motions to suppress is
not novel and is grounded solely on the presence of particularized facts
that allowed the court to find exigent circumstances within the contours of familiar exceptions to the warrant requirement. Neither does
the state's retention of its former procedure rule of automatic standing
provide any basis for the fear that the holding provides a windfall for
criminal defendants. 88 N.J. at 235, 440 A.2d at 1323 (Schreiber, J.,
concurring). The import of the decision lies in the continued willingness of New Jersey courts, under principles of federalism, to provide
its citizens with constitutional protections in the face of United States
Supreme Court decisions which provide inadequate protection. Thus,
in the face of federal retrenchment, the principles of the new federalism espoused by state courts can provide the primary arena for the
protection of individual rights. See Mosk, The New States Rights, 10
CAL. J. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 8 (1976).
M.C.U.

EXECUTIVE

POWER-EMERCENCY

PowERs-ExECUTIVE

ORDER

MADE PURSUANT TO "EMERGENCY PowERs" NOT BEYOND SCOPE OF
STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND NOT USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE OR

JUDICIAL

PowER- Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J. 183, 440 A.2d

1128 (1982).
In 1981, the Atlantic County Jail was well above its maximum

rated capacity for housing inmates, particularly due to the number of
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state prisoners it had received from overcrowded state facilities. 88
N.J. at 189-90, 440 A.2d at 1131. As a result, county officials initiated
in the Superior Court an action in lieu of prerogative writ against the
State Commissioner of Corrections, asserting that the Commissioner
had a statutory duty to take custody of the state prisoners. Id. at 190,

440 A.2d at 1131 (citing N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:43-10(e) (West Cum.

Supp. 1981), and id. § 30:4-6 (regulating transfer to state prison of
state prisoners sentenced for terms over one year)). The Commissioner
asserted as an affirmative defense Executive Order No. 106, which
was issued by Governor Byrne after the suit was commenced. 88 N.J.
at 191, 440 A.2d at 1132. The order declared the overcrowding in
state prisons to be an "emergency" and relieved the Commissioner of
his duty under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-10(e) to accept custody of
certain state prisoners housed in county jails. 88 N.J. at 190, 440 A.2d
at 1131. The order also placed exclusive authority to allocate prisoners
among county facilities in the Commissioner. The order, which was to
expire by its own terms in ninety days, cited the Disaster Control Act,
N.J. STAT. ANN. App. A. 9-30, as authority for this exercise of executive power. 88 N.J. at 188, 440 A.2d at 1130. Under the power
granted by the order, the Commissioner made Atlantic County the
permanent place of confinement for those state prisoners already
located there. Id. at 191, 440 A.2d at 1132.
Judge Gruccio of the law division referred the issue concerning
the validity of the Executive Order to the appellate division in accordance with N.J. CT. R. 1:1-2. The appellate panel affirmed the validity
of the order. Subsequently, the Governor issued Executive Order No.
108, extending the ninety-day period of effectiveness of the previous
order. An appeal as of right was taken to the supreme court on the
basis of a dissent in the appellate division. 88 N.J. at 191-92, 440 A.2d
at 1132; see N.J. CT. R. 2:2-1(a) (2). In a unanimous decision, the New
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the Governor's order
from the perspectives of the statutory power vested in the executive
and the order's consistency with the doctrine of separation of powers;
and, it affirmed the validity of the Commissioner's actions as pursued
under the authority of the order. 88 N.J. at 210, 440 A.2d at 1142.
The court acknowledged that the Disaster Control Act conferred
upon the executive broad powers to provide for the public welfare in
emergency situations, especially when life or property are placed in
jeopardy. Id. at 194, 440 A.2d at 1133. While the crises caused by
overcrowded prisons may not appear to be a sudden, isolated, or
unusual event so as to fit some definitions of "emergency," it nonetheless came within the scope of the Act as the kind of situation that
warranted executive action. Id. at 195, 440 A.2d at 1134. Moreover,
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the means employed by Executive Order No. 106 to alleviate the
emergency were consonant with the legislature's purpose in conferring
the emergency powers, i.e., the protection of the public. To draw this
conclusion, the court found that the measures taken by Governor
Byrne were responsive to the crisis they purported to address. The
court intimated that given the gravity of the prison situation, the
order, which was limited in scope and life span, was even a modest
exercise of power. Id. at 202, 440 A.2d at 1138. But although it
approved of the subsequent order extending the life span of the first,
the court warned that too many such extensions would constitute "a
• . . wholesale takeover by the state of county penal facilities." Id. at
204, 440 A.2d at 1138-39.
The court also found that the Governor's exercise of his emergency powers suspended the normal operation of the statutes requiring the transfer of state prisoners from county to state facilities. Id. at
200, 440 A.2d at 1137. It noted that an inexorable operation of those
statutes would not comport with the very delegation of emergency
powers. Likewise, the Commissioner's actions pursued under the authority of the executive order, i.e., to maintain permanently the state
prisoners in the county facilities, were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Although these actions ran contrary to the mandate of the
statutes, they "ma[de] sense" under the circumstances. Id. at 205, 440
A.2d at 1139.
Finally, the court held that Executive Order No. 106 did not
contravene the doctrine of separation of powers. The order was issued
pursuant to a delegation of authority by the legislature, id. at 208, 440
A.2d at 1141, and it in no way interfered with, but rather "superseded
• . . the judicial process." Id. at 210, 440 A.2d at 1142.
The Worthington decision fails on two counts. First, it fails to
account for the propriety of Executive Order No. 106 as a responsive
remedy to the problem of prison overcrowding. The court justified the
order by expanding the definition of "emergency" beyond semantical
recognition and by proceeding upon the unarticulated assumption
that because prison conditions required that something be done, any
executive action would fit the bill. Likewise, the decision glossed over
the propriety of the Commissioner's actions pursued under the color of
the order. These actions perpetuated, at least initially and perhaps
indefinitely, the very conditions that prompted the commencement of
this lawsuit. Second, the decision fails to account for the proper
allocation of governmental power. The opinion is unconvincing on the
issue of the executive's usurpation of legislative power. Moreover, the
order unabashedly contravened the will of the legislature as expressed
in the statutes under consideration. Equally disturbing is the unad-
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dressed issue of executive interference in the judicial process. The
order did not issue until this suit was commenced. By interposing an
emergency measure while the suit was pending, the executive effectively withdrew the suit from a judicial resolution on the merits.
Whatever its language limiting the scope of the holding, Worthington
signals a constriction of the scope of judicial review of executive
decisions, at least when they are conceived as an exercise of "emergency" power.
C.E.R.

LIS PENDENS-DuE PROCESS
PENDENS

STATUTE

OF

LAW-NOTICE FUNCTION OF Lis

NOT VIOLATIVE

OF

DUE

PROCESS

CLAUSE-

United Savings & Loan Association v. Scruggs, 181 N.J. Super.
52, 436 A.2d 559 (Ch. Div. 1981).
The defendant Scruggs executed a mortgage in favor of the plaintiff savings and loan bank in 1978 to secure the payment of a debt.
The mortgage was recorded on the day of its creation. 181 N.J. Super.
at 53, 436 A.2d at 560. Approximately three years later, the bank
commenced an action in the chancery division to foreclose the mortgage on the ground that Scruggs had defaulted on payments due. Id.
at 53-54, 436 A.2d at 560. Having filed a complaint, the bank, as is
customary in New Jersey, filed a statutory notice of lis pendens pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-9 (West 1952).
During the pendency of the action, a federal district court held in
an unrelated case that New Jersey's lis pendens procedure was unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 519 F. Supp. 1252 (D.N.J.
1981), rev'd, 670 F.2d 1316 (3d Cir. 1982). Prompted by the district
court decision, the bank, on its own motion, requested the chancery
division for either permission to file a non-statutory notice of lis
pendens, or, in the alternative, a declaration that its original statutory
filing was and had remained valid. 181 N.J. Super. at 54, 436 A.2d at
560. No appearance was entered for the defendant. Id. at 53, 436
A.2d at 560.
In the present opinion, the chancery court, per Judge Dreier,
granted the plaintiff's motion insofar as it upheld the validity of the
original statutory notice of lis pendens. Id. at 54, 436 A.2d at 560.
Although not bound by the district court opinion, the court noted the
imminent effect of Chrysler on a variety of lien enforcement proceedings. Id. at 58, 436 A.2d at 562. Distinguishing Chrylser, the court
held that a plaintiff may validly employ the lis pendens procedure to
enforce a pre-existing, publicly noticed lien on realty without triggering due process considerations. Id. at 59, 436 A.2d at 563.
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A plaintiff may file notice of lis pendens when the object of the
underlying action is "to enforce a lien ... upon real estate or to affect
the title to real estate or a lien or encumbrance thereon." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:15-6. The court identified within the language of the
statute two distinct functions of the procedure: a notice function,
whereby a plaintiff with a pre-existing lien or interest of record files to
put the world on notice that an action to enforce that lien has been
commenced; and, a substantive function, whereby a plaintiff seeking
to obtain title or establish an interest files to put the world on notice
that a new lien, superior to all subsequently obtained interests in the
property, has been asserted.
The court held that Chrysler invalidated the lis pendens procedure in its substantive aspect because the plaintiff in that case had no
present interest, claim, or lien upon the defendant's property at the
time the suit was commenced. 181 N.J. Super. at 56, 436 A.2d at 56162. In contrast, the present suit involved only the notice function of lis
pendens. The bank had a recorded mortgage of three years' standing
and filed merely to put future purchasers, lienors, or mortgagees on
notice that a pre-existing claim was being foreclosed. Id. at 58, 436
A.2d at 563.
Going one step further, the court outlined a procedure whereby a
plaintiff may constitutionally employ the substantive function of the
statute, i.e., "to affect the title to real estate or a lien or encumbrance
thereon." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-6. The plaintiff should "proceed as
if" he were applying for a writ of attachment under N.J. CT. R. 4:605(a). 181 N.J. Super. at 60, 436 A.2d at 563. Upon the plaintiff's
motion for permission to file notice of lis pendens, the court would
weigh the deprivation that the defendant would suffer against the
interest that the plaintiff would acquire in the defendant's property
through the filed notice of lis pendens. The plaintiff would be required to make a minimal showing that his claim warrants the defendant's loss.
The court further noted that an ex parte order may be issued, but
only if the court finds that there is a likelilhood that the purpose for
providing notice would be defeated. An ex parte order could be
obtained by following N.J. CT. R. 4:52-1(a), the procedure for applying ex parte for an order to show cause with temporary restraints. This
procedure would afford the defendant the opportunity to move to
dissolve the "restraint," namely, the filed notice of lis pendens, upon
two days notice to the plaintiff. 181 N.J. Super. at 60-61, 436 A.2d at
563-64.
In Scruggs, the chancery court proferred a cure for the unconstitutionality of the substantive aspect of the lis pendens statute. Despite
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the reversal by the court of appeals in Chrysler, which would appear
to vitiate the need for the cure, Judge Dreier's remedial procedure has
relevance to other lien enforcement proceedings that may be found to
fall short of the requirements of the due process clause.
C.E.R.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-BONDS-STATE LAW
MUNICIPALITY

FROM INDIRECT

PROSCRIBES A

GUARANTEE OF BONDS

ISSUED

BY

AUTHoRITY-Gallo v. Township Committee,
181 N.J. Super. 385, 437 A.2d 738 (Law Div. 1981).

MUNICIPAL PORT

The Weehawken Municipal Port Authority adopted a resolution
to issue $17,715,000 in bonds to acquire certain land and facilities
upon which it planned to build a refrigeration plant and warehouse.
This land would be improved to specifications and leased to two
private businessses. 181 N.J. Super. at 387, 372, 437 A.2d at 739, 742.
Neither the authority nor the private concerns had the credit necessary
to support such a large bond issue, but the Township of Weehawken
did. Id. at 387-88, 437 A.2d at 739. New Jersey Municipal Port
Authorities Law provides, however, that a municipality neither can
guarantee nor become directly liable for bonds which a municipal

port authority issues. N.J.

STAT.

ANN.

§§ 40:68A-29 to -69 (West

Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). To circumvent this prohibition and secure
the critical support of Weehawken's credit, the authority structured a
four-step transaction for leasing the improved premises to the businesses. The authority first would purchase the land and facilities, then
lease the premises to the township for a rent equivalent to the bond
debt service. The town would then lease the premises back to the
authority for an amount equal to the debt service plus $350,000 per
year. The authority, finally, would improve the land to specifications
and lease the premises to the private concerns. 181 N.J. Super. at 388,
437 A.2d at 739-40. The Township Committee of Weehawken authorized the lease on July 22, 1981. Forty-eight days after publication of
the notice of the authority's adoption of the bond offering, two members of the Township Committee filed this action in lieu of prerogative
writ to restrain the issuance of the bonds, alleging it was based on a
statutorily prohibited municipal guarantee. Id. at 387-88, 392-93, 437
A.2d at 739-40, 742. Despite defendant's contention that this was a

mere rental obligation authorized by N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 40A:12-6(a)

(West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), the court looked beyond the form of
the transaction and held that in substance the obligation was a guarantee. 181 N.J. Super. at 387-87, 437 A.2d at 739-40.
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Turning to the pertinent statutes, the court first analyzed the
specific prohibition against municipal guarantees of port authority
bonds found in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:68A-51. Judge Castano, writing
for the court, noted that New Jersey courts had strictly construed
"virtually the same" language in the Parking Authority Law and the
Municipal Utilities Authorities Law to prohibit indirect as well as
direct municipal guarantees of authority bonds. The court explained
that in responding to such judicial decisions, the legislature amended
the parking law to permit municipal guarantees of parking authority
bonds; however, it had made no such provisions in either the utilities
authority or port authority laws. It was clear, according to the court,
that in failing to amend the port authority law, the New Jersey
legislature intended it to be narrowly construed. 181 N.J. Super. at
389-90, 437 A.2d at 740-41.
The port authority law provides that "[a]ny municipal port authority and any person may enter into a contract ... relating to use
• . . of the port system . . . . Any such contract may provide for

payment." N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 40:68A-58 (emphasis added). The court

noted that similar language in the utilities authority law had previously supported transactions amounting to municipal guarantees. Id.
at 390, 437 A.2d at 741. That statute was distinguished from the one
at issue, however, because it allowed for contracts to be entered into
by "[a]ny municipal authority and any municipality." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40:14B-49 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981) (emphasis added).
Further, observing that the port authority law expressly defines "person" to exclude municipalities, id. § 40:68A-31, Judge Castano held
that the port authority law by its terms was not as broad as the
utilities statute.
Concluding its statutory analysis, the court addressed other language found in the port authority law stating that "[a]ny such bonds
may be additionally secured by a pledge of any grant or contributions
from ...any municipality." Id. § 40:68A-45. The court held that this
would not support a municipal guarantee, relying on a similar holding in earlier cases. 181 N.J. Super. at 391-92, 437 A.2d at 741-42.
The court finally addressed the statute of limitations defense. The
defendant asserted that the claim was barred because it was filed
forty-eight days after publication of notice of the authority's adoption
of the bond offering, thus exceeding the twenty-day statutory limit set
forth in the court rules. The court found, however, that the time
could be extended under the rules when necessary in the interest of
justice. Although Judge Castano stated that an extension would be
justified here, he held that it was not necessary because the action was
directed at the July 22 ordinance authorizing the lease and was com-
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menced before the forty-five day limitation provided in court rules.
181 N.J. Super. at 392-93, 437 A.2d at 742.
Although the Gallo court leaves open the possibility of future
legislative amendment to the port authority law, the law as it stands
serves a useful purpose as a check on overspending by municipal port
authorities. The check it imposes will improve the finicial position of
the authorities and will tend to boost investor confidence in authority
bond issue.
R.T.T.

PUBLIC UTILITIES-STATE ORDER

REQUIRINc TEMPoRARY CONTINUATION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST OF UNPROFITABLE SERVICE NOT AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING-DeCamp Bus Lines v. Department

of Transportation, 182 N.J. Super. 42, 440 A.2d 32 (App. Div.

1982).
Seeking to cancel its unprofitable intrastate bus routes, DeCamp
Bus Lines applied to the Board of Public Utilities (BPU) for permission
to discontinue this service. The petition was denied. Without taking a
direct appeal, DeCamp notified the Commissioner of Transportation
of its intent to cancel both regular and charter intrastate service.
DeCamp also posted notices to this effect on its buses, specifying that
service would terminate on June 30, 1980. 182 N.J. Super. at 44, 440
A.2d at 33. The Department of Transportation (DOT) ordered DeCamp to continue service until it complied with N.J. STAT. ANN. §
48:2-24 (West 1969), which requires a public utility to obtain permission from BPU in order to discontinue service. Asserting its right to
discontinue service without complying with the statute, DeCamp
sought a declaratory judgment in the chancery division, which transferred the matter to the appellate division due to its status as an
administrative appeal. The case was consolidated with an appeal
from the DOT order. 182 N.J. Super. at 45, 440 A.2d at 34. On
appeal, DeCamp claimed that the DOT order deprived the bus company of due process of law in that the right to go out of business
cannot be curtailed by statute. Id. at 46, 440 A.2d at 35. The appellate division denied the request for declaratory relief and affirmed the
DOT order. Id. at 47, 440 A.2d at 35. The court first weighed the
conflicting interests involved: the public's interest in the continuation
of a service upon which they depended; and, the interest of DeCamp's
stockholders, who for private reasons desired to liquidate the corporation. Id. at 49, 440 A.2d at 36.
The appellate division reviewed prior case law and found that
the state had authority to require public utilities to continue providing
unprofitable services. The court found that a utility's duty to accept
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the risk of pecuniary loss stemmed from "the acceptance and enjoyment of the powers granted by the State," and arose in response to
local public need. Answering DeCamp's due process claim, the court
noted that permission to discontinue services could not be unreasonably withheld. Relying upon federal precedent, the appellate division
decided that the DOT could order DeCamp to continue service "'for a
reasonable time, during which alternative service possibilities and
certificate (of Public Convenience and Necessity) transfers may be
explored." Id. at 47, 440 A.2d at 35.
The court also dismissed DeCamp's assertion that upon exercising
its "absolute right" to terminate intrastate service, it would no longer
be subject to the provisions of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-24. The court
observed that DeCamp's construction of the statute would defeat clear
legislative intent that the utility may not cease "any" operation absent
state sanction. 182 N.J. Super. at 49, 440 A.2d at 36.
The matter was then remanded to the DOT for further consideration of DeCamp's application to discontinue intrastate service. Specifically, the court stated that the DOT should apply its "agency
expertise" in deciding whether DeCamp's charter operations should
be separately considered, and what bearing, if any, DeCamp's proposed continuance of its intrastate operations would have. Id. at 50,
440 A.2d at 37.
This decision is a clear recognition of the rights of consumers of
public services. Although strictly limited to consideration of public
utilities, the case presents an interesting analogical perspective when
applied to other providers of necessary services. Under a similar line of
reasoning, other commercial entities could be compelled to continue
operation in the public interest, even though such action would be
economically detrimental. As presented here, the possibility for exploitation of the court's protection of the public interest from the
financial motivations of those who serve it appears substantial.
M.J.M.

REAL PROPERTY-WAMANTY-WARRANTY

OF HABITABILITY
TENDED TO SUBSEQUENT PUcIHASER-Hermes v. Staiano, 181

Ex-

N.J.

Super. 424, 437 A.2d 925 (Law Div. 1981).
In 1969, the defendant Staiano Wood Products, Inc., built a onefamily house on a lot owned by defendants Louis and Emma Staiano.
During the same year, the defendants conveyed the lot and residence
to Donald and Susan Brigham. In January 1973, the plaintiffs Francis
and Constance Hermes took title to this property. This was the plaintiffs, first purchase of a residential property and they inspected the
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premises numerous times prior to the closing. 181 N.J. Super. at 426,
437 A.2d at 926. After taking possession, problems arose concerning
the septic system and flooding of the basement. The septic problem
ended when the use of water was curtailed. The flooding of the
basement increased until it was alleviated by plugging in the sump
pump. As a result of the flooding, the basement could not be used for
the storage of personal goods and belongings. In June 1976, the septic
system could not take any discharge from any of the equipment in the
home until the septic tank was cleared of accumulated outflow. In
addition, a ten-to-fifteen foot "crack" in the foundation was first
noticed in the middle of the rear basement wall. Id. at 427, 437 A.2d
at 926-27. Approximately twenty-one months later, following a period of stormy weather, about eighteen inches of water accumulated
in the basement. Also, the crack in the foundation had increased to
forty feet in length. As a result, complicated repair work was undertaken in the basement, which rendered a substantial portion of it
unusable. Id. at 427-28, 437 A.2d at 927.
Plaintiffs brought suit claiming, inter alia, a breach of implied
warranty of habitability, as well as strict liability in tort. It was
alleged that the crack in the foundation threatened "the structural
integrity of the entire residence." Id. at 428, 437 A.2d at 927. At the
conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, the defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint. The defendants' argument was threefold. First, they contended that the statute of limitations had run prior to the filing of the
complaint. Id., 437 A.2d at 927. Second, an implied warranty of
habitability is limited to first purchasers of residences. Id. at 430-31,
437 A.2d at 928. Third, strict liability should not be available to
remote purchasers since privity of contract is required. Id. at 432-33,
437 A.2d at 929.
Judge Miller, writing for the court, first recited the established
New Jersey rule "that a cause of action grounded in tort accrues, not
when the tortious act occurs, but when the consequential injury or the
damage occurs." Id. at 429, 437 A.2d at 927. The problem which
arose did not become evident nor cause damage until long after the
house had been purchased by the plaintiffs. Since the cause of action
did not accrue until the damage resulted, the court held that the filing
of the complaint was well within the statute of limitations. Id. at 430,
437 A.2d at 928.
As to the second issue, although the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability protects the
purchasers of newly constructed residences, see McDonald v.
Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 294-95, 398 A.2d 1283, 1293 (1979), the issue
of whether later purchasers were within the protection of the warranty was left open. Id. at 295 n.5., 398 A.2d at 1293 n.5. After
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noting a split of authority on the issue in other jurisdictions, the court
held that, as a logical extension of McDonald, subsequent purchasers
should be protected by the warranty. The court reasoned that
the builder-vendor is in a better position to prevent the occurrence
of such major problems and must know that the system will remain
hidden and that both the initial purchaser and anyone else who
purchases the home will rely upon the skill and experience of the
builder-vendor for their proper functioning.
181 N.J. Super. at 432, 437 A.2d at 929.
With regard to the final issue, the court first restated the rule that
privity of contract is not an element of products liability. The court
then noted that strict liability not only imposes warranty obligations,
but also removes such contractual impediments as privity of contract,
which at one time were connected with warranty actions. Innocent
purchasers, whether initial or subsequent purchasers, are to be protected. Id. at 433, 437 A.2d at 929-30.
This case represents a logical extension of the law of warranty.
Consumer protection demands that a house be constructed so as to be
reasonably fit for its intended use. The average purchaser is without
either adequate knowledge of or the ability to inspect each portion,
especially those which remain hidden, of a newly purchased, though
not necessarily newly constructed, home. It should be noted that this
extension of liability should be limited to those defects which are
latent and not ordinarily discoverable until a later time.
D.T.K.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS-MERCHANT

STANDARD

OF

"GooD

FAITH" INAPPLICABLE TO BuYER ABSENT A SHOWING OF SPECIALIZED

Harvest, Inc. v. Rig & Crane Equipment
Corp., 181 N.J. Super. 41, 436 A.2d 553 (Ch. Div. 1981).

KNOWLEDGE-Sea

Plaintiff Sea Harvest, Inc. (Sea Harvest) leased a crane from
defendant Rig & Crane Equipment Corp. (Rig & Crane) in August,
1976. Sea Harvest later purchased the crane pursuant to an option in
the lease agreement with Rig & Crane. In the intervening period, but
prior to the reduction of the lease to writing, defendant Allis
Chalmers Credit Corp. (Allis Chalmers) loaned Rig & Crane $39,000,
secured by a security agreement covering the crane leased to Sea
Harvest. 181 N.J. Super. at 44, 436 A.2d at 555. The security interest
was perfected by the filing of financing statements in Pennsylvania,
Rig & Crane's place of business. Upon the lessor/debtor Rig & Crane's
failure to repay its loan, Allis Chalmers advised Sea Harvest, the prior
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lessee now vendee, that it intended to repossess the crane. Id. at 45,
436 A.2d at 555.
Sea Harvest then instituted suit seeking permanent injunctive
relief against such repossession and requesting a declaratory judgment
confirming its title to the crane, plus damages. Id., 436 A.2d at 555.
The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, holding that Sea Harvest owned the crane free from any security interest of Allis Chalmers
and free from any interest of Rig & Crane. No damages were
awarded. Id. at 52, 436 A.2d at 559.
The plaintiff's primary claim of ownership was that it was a
"buyer in the ordinary course of business" under N.J. STAT. ANN. §
12A:9-307(1) (West 1962) [hereinafter all statutory references are to

N.J.

STAT. ANN.,

Title 12A (West 1962 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981)].

Under section 9-307(1), a buyer in the ordinary course of business
takes free of any perfected security interest created by his seller. The
court's application of this section required a determination whether
the plaintiff met the definition of a "buyer in ordinary course of
business" set forth in section 1-201(9). Specifically, the court evaluated whether Sea Harvest purchased "in good faith" and "from a
person in the business of selling goods of that kind" under the section
1-201(9) standard. 181 N.J. Super. at 45, 436 A.2d at 555-56.
While Sea Harvest asserted that it met the requirements of section 9-307(1), Allis Chalmers first claimed that plaintiff's seller, Rig &
Crane, did not conform to the section 1-201(9) requirement of being
"in the business of selling goods of that kind" because the seller's
business primarily was leasing, rather than selling cranes. Id. at 45,
436 A.2d at 556. The court found that although Rig & Crane primarily was in the crane leasing business, it also was "a substantial seller"
of cranes. Such activity was sufficient to classify Rig & Crane as "in
the business of selling goods of that kind." Id. at 47, 436 A.2d at 557.
The court then considered the question of Sea Harvest's "good
faith." Sea Harvest contended that it should be held to the section 1201(19) definition of good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." Allis Chalmers contended that Sea Harvest
should be held to the higher standard of good faith applicable to
merchants under section 2-103(1)(b), which requires not only honesty
in fact but also the "observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade." Thus, if Sea Harvest were adjudged to be a
merchant, the higher standard of good faith would have required it to
"check the appropriate records for financing statements before making its purchase." Id. at 47-48, 436 A.2d at 557. Failure to do so
would deny it the protection due a "buyer in the ordinary course." Id.
In evaluating the argument for application of the Article 2 standard of good faith to Sea Harvest, the court interpreted the section
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2-104(1) definition of "merchant" and found that plaintiff lacked the
specialized knowledge which would subject it to the good faith burden placed on merchants. The court concluded that the plaintiff
bought and sold equipment only sporadically for its own business use,
that it had little familiarity with financing statements or security
agreements, and that it understood little about equipment liens. Id. at
48-49, 436 A.2d at 557-58.
Alternatively, the court asserted in dicta that even if it had found
the plaintiff to have been a merchant, the higher merchant good faith
standard of section 2-103(1)(b) would not have applied in this case.
Utilizing the canons of code construction that require internal sequencing consistency, the court concluded that for the purpose of
section 9-307, the subjective good faith standard of Article 1 must
prevail. In support of this conclusion, the court first looked to the
limiting language of section 2-103(6), which restricts application of
the merchant standard to Article 2 "unless the context otherwise
requires." Id. at 49-50, 436 A.2d at 558. Determining that Article 2 is
inapposite to the purchase of goods subject to an Article 9 security
interest, the court relied upon the statutory mandate that Article 2
"does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an
unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate
only as a security transaction." Id. at 50, 436 A.2d at 558 (quoting
section 2-102).
Although no issue can be taken with the court's conclusion that
Sea Harvest purchased without knowledge of Allis Chalmers' security
interest, nor the finding that Rig & Crane was a seller, not merely a
lessor of the type of equipment in question, the proofs establishing Sea
Harvest as a buyer in the ordinary course of business and not a
merchant may be more open to inquiry because Sea Harvest was a
purchaser of equipment on a recurring, if non-regular basis. However, the court's alternative holding or dicta that the good faith standard for merchants does not apply to an Article 9 buyer in the ordinary
course of business raises difficult questions. If Article 2's heightened
standard of good faith is inapplicable to the purchaser of goods covered by a security interest, then the ease with which such interests
may be circumvented puts the so-called secured lender in a quite
insecure position.
On its face the holding allows a merchant to assume the stance of
a buyer in the "ordinary course" and take free of protected security
interests unless he has actual knowledge of the interest and has knowledge that his purchase is to the detriment of the holder of the interest.
Such a doctrine would afford little or no protection to the holders of
security interests and would create a climate in which the protections
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of section 9-307 would extend far beyond the classes of purchasers the
Article was designed to protect. See McFadden v. Mercantile-Sale
Deposit & Trust Co., 260 Md. 601, 273 A.2d 198 (1971) and Cunningham v. Camelot Motors, Inc., 138 N.J. Super. 489, 351 A.2d 402
(Ch. Div. 1975) (section 9-307(1) protects bona fide purchasers for
value who acquire good in ordinary course of business from merchants
inventory).
If Sea Harvest is limited to its primary holdings, i.e., that Sea
Harvest, a non-merchant, purchased from one in the business of
selling goods of the kind sold, and, as such, acted with subjective good
faith, the decision lacks long range import. However, the suggestion
that a merchant purchaser may invoke the protections of 9-307(1) for
buyers in the ordinary course, free of the strictures of good faith
required of merchants, places a novel construct upon the purposes of
the Uniform Commercial Code. A transaction is not disqualified as a
transaction in goods merely because the goods may be subject to a
security interest. The nature of the transaction remains the same. The
existence of the security interest simply adds an additional dimension
to a determination of the rights of the parties thereto but does not
excind the primary duties of buyers and sellers of goods. The burden
of good faith should be determined by the identities of the parties and
the nature of the transaction, not the presence or absence of encumbrances upon the chattel.
T.D.M.

TAXATION-Loss

OF FARMLAND ASSESSMENT

DoEs

NOT AUTOMATI-

RECAPTRE TAXES ON UNDER-UTILIZED AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY-Jackson Township v. Paolin, 181 N.J. Super.
293, 437 A.2d 344 (Tax Ct. 1981).
CALLY TRICGE

Patsy Paolin owned two non-contiguous parcels of land in Jackson Township. 181 N.J. Super. at 295, 437 A.2d at 345. Since 1938, he
had owned, farmed, and lived upon one of these parcels, Lot 84. Id.
at 297, 437 A.2d at 346. Although previously active in general farming, Paolin had in recent years significantly curtailed his farming
activities, particularly because of his advancing years and declining
health. Id. at 298, 437 A.2d at 346. In spite of the lack of farming
activity, Paolin applied to Jackson Township for farmland assessment
for Lot 84 for the year 1976. See Farmland Assessment Act of 1964,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.1 to -23.7 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
He included in his application for Lot 84 a reference to the other
parcel, Lot 70, but failed to include its acreage in the request for
assessment under the favorable tax status. 181 N.J. Super. at 296, 437
A.2d at 346.
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The Jackson Township tax assessor denied Paolin's request for
farmland assessment. The Ocean County Board of Taxation reversed
this judgment and granted farmland assessment for both lots. Once it
determined that the lots were entitled to the preferred status, the
Board imposed deferred or "rollback" taxes on both lots because of the
cessation of farming activities since 1977. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:423.8. The Township appealed the Board's grant of farmland assessment for Lot 70, because no separate application was ever filed with
respect to it, and for Lot 84, because farming activity had been
terminated during the years to which the assessment appertained.
Paolin appealed the Board's judgment imposing rollback taxes. 181
N.J. Super. at 295, 437 A.2d at 345.
The Tax Court of New Jersey consolidated the appeals and reversed the judgment of the Board granting farmland assessment with
respect to both lots. With respect to Lot 70, the taxpayer's utter failure
to comply with a regulation requiring separate applications was sufficient to invalidate the assessment, and, thereby, moot the imposition
of rollback taxes on that parcel. Id. at 297, 437 A.2d at 346. With
respect to Lot 84, the court held that the property was not "actively
devoted to agricultural. . . use" within the meaning of the Farmland
Assessment Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.1. 181 N.J. Super. at 300,
437 A.2d at 348. In light of this holding, the court faced the issue
whether the "loss of farmland assessment automatically trigger[ed] the
imposition of rollback taxes." Id. at 301, 437 A.2d at 348. In other
words, since it had found that the lands were no longer "devoted to
agricultural .. . use," the question arose whether the abatement in
agricultural use necessitated the conclusion that there had been a
"'change in use" sufficient to trigger the imposition of rollback taxes.
The tax court held that the mere loss of farmland assessment was not
an "undisputed change in use" and, therefore, did not warrant the
imposition of rollback taxes. Id. at 309, 437 A.2d at 353.
The rollback statute states that when land which has been valued
for tax purposes as farmland "is applied to a use other than agriculture
• . .it shall be subject to additional taxes . .. (i.e.) rollback taxes."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.8. The computation of the rollback tax is
the difference between taxes paid under the farmland assessment and
the taxes that would have been paid without the favorable valuation.
This tax is due not only for the year in which the use is changed, but
also for "two tax years immediately preceding" the change. Id.
The major question which the tax court addressed was the interpretation of the phrases "a use other than agriculture" and "change in
use," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.8. 181 N.J. Super. at 301, 437 A.2d at
348. The state had argued that the lack of farming was "a use other
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than agriculture" under the rollback statute and also a "change in use"
sufficient to trigger tax recapture. In rejecting that argument, the
court relied on New Jersey case law, legislative intent, and the approach taken in other jurisdictions with similar farmland tax treatment. The court stated that cases which had found "change in use,"
sufficient to trigger the rollback taxes all concerned undisputed
changes in use, such as urbanization or suburbanization of the property. Id. at 307-08, 437 A.2d at 352.
The Tax Court also examined the statutory language to determine the legislative intent, and held that the word "change" required
"an active conversion from one positive type of land use to another,"
rather than mere cessation of farming. 181 N.J. Super. at 303, 437
A.2d at 349. The court reasoned that had the legislature intended
otherwise, it would have stated that rollback taxes are required whenever land "simply ceased to be 'actively devoted to agricultural use."'
Id. at 304, 437 A.2d at 350. In addition, the court determined that the
legislative history of the Act showed that the purpose of the rollback
taxes was to protect rural municipalities against land speculation and
to preserve the family farm from urban, commercial, industrial, and
highway development. Id. Thus, the court determined that to impose
rollback taxes on a farmer who has become enfeebled and unable to
actively farm his land would be inconsistent with these purposes. Id.
at 308-09, 437 A.2d at 352.
In addition, the tax court found almost universal acceptance of
the view that loss of farmland assessment did not automatically activate rollback taxes in other states with similar statutes. These states
also required an active conversion from "open space to a more intensive use" in order to trigger the tax. Id. at 307-08, 437 A.2d at 352.
Finally, the tax court analyzed the penalty factor of the rollback
recapture. Since the statute required a recapture of the benefit for the
year of change and for the two preceeding years, the court determined
that the statute was not designed to apply to under-utilized property.
Rather, the court found that the statute was meant to penalize more
intense and more profitable use of land. Id. at 308-09, 437 A.2d at
352.
As a case of first impression, this court's holding effectively protects the aging farmer from an over-zealous application of the taxdeferral/tax-recapture design of the Farmland Assessment Act and
rollback provisions. The municipality is protected against landowners
abusing the benefits of farm assessment to reduce their taxes while
actively distorting the rural character of the land with urbanization,
suburbanization, and commercialization. It is also protected against
the heavy penalties of the rollback tax, though it loses its former tax
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benefits under farmland assessment. The court has balanced the conflicting interests and needs of the parties concerned and provided the
state with a fair and reasonable interpretation of the Act.
F.T.L.

TAXATION-APPORTIONMENT-

OFFICES OF PARENT CORPORATION
NOT "RECULAR PLACE OF BUSINESS" FOR PURPOSE OF APPORTIONNET INCOME FOR FRANCHISE TAx-Rocappi,
Inc. v. Taxation Division Director, 3 N.J. Tax 311, 182 N.J.
Super. 163 (1981).
MENT OF SUBSIDIARY'S

Plaintiff Rocappi, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation and a subsidiary of Lehigh Press, Inc., also a Pennsylvania corporation, transacted
business and had its corporate headquarters in New Jersey. Lehigh
Press opened sales offices in California and Massachusetts. The California office had one salesman whose attendance in the office was
infrequent, while the Massachusetts office had three salesmen and one
full-time secretary. Both offices had telephones, building directories,
and business cards in the Lehigh name. The offices' expenses were
initially paid for by the Lehigh Press, and were later passed on to the
subsidiaries. When a salesman from either of these offices made a sale
benefiting one subsidiary, that subsidiary would pay a predetermined
commission to Lehigh Press. The commission was intended to cover
the salesman's commission plus office expenses. 3 N.J. Tax at 313-15,
182 N.J. Super. at 165-67. From 1973 to 1975, plaintiff paid franchise
taxes to California. On the tax returns, however, it reported neither
rental or ownership of any tangible assets, nor any compensation for
employees. Not being qualified to do business in Massachusetts, plaintiff paid no taxes there. In New Jersey, plaintiff reported on its tax
returns for the three years in question that it had one out-of-state
place of business. Id. at 315, 182 N.J. Super. at 168.
Rocappi appealed the Taxation Division Director's finding that
under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-6 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982), for
the years 1973-1975, plaintiff was not entitled to apportion its net
income for franchise tax purposes to Massachusetts and California, in
addition to New Jersey. 3 N.J. Tax at 312, 315-16, 182 N.J. Super. at
165, 168. The Tax Court of New Jersey, after determining that plaintiff had not maintained regular places of business outside of New
Jersey, and alternatively, that disallowing plaintiff's apportionment of
its net income to California, Massachusetts and New Jersey would not
violate the commerce clause, affirmed. Id. at 321, 326 182 N.J. Super.
at 173, 178.
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The statute provides that if a taxpayer "maintains a regular place
of business" in a state other than New Jersey, it may allocate the
appropriate net income to that state; however, in the event there is no
out-of-state business, then 100 % of the net income will be subject to
the New Jersey franchise tax. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-6. A regulation defines "regular place of business" as "any bona fide office ... ,
factory, warehouse, or other space of the taxpayer which is regularly
maintained, occupied and used by the taxpayer in carrying on its
business and in which one or more regular employees are in attend-

ance." N.J.

ADMIN. CODE tit.

18, § 7-7.2(a)(1979).

In construing the meaning of the phrase, "maintain[ing] a regular place of business," the tax court looked to Hoeganaesv. Directorof
Division of Taxation, 145 N.J. Super. 352, 367 A.2d 1182 (App. Div.
1976). In Hoeganaes, the company desired to allocate its net income
to six states where it had located full-time employees who used space
in their homes for conducting business. Applying a subjective test, the
tax court found the offices to satisfy the definition. The majority of the
appellate court, however, applying an objective test, reversed. Id. at
356, 367 A.2d at 1184. The majority held that "'regularly maintained'
and 'occupied and used by the taxpayer' and 'regular employees in
attendance' imply a place which to the ordinary person is more than a
location where an employee writes up reports in his own home." 3
N.J. Tax at 318-19, 182 N.J. Super. at 171 (quoting 145 N.J. Super. at
360, 367 A.2d at 1186). Applying the objective test of Hoeganaes, the
court found that the California office was infrequently attended, that
both offices were initiated by Lehigh Press, not plaintiff, and that
plaintiff's control over the offices was indirect, plaintiff could not be
considered to have "regularly maintained" the offices as required by
the regulation. 3 N.J. Tax at 320-21, 182 N.J. Super. at 173.
The plaintiff next argued that a denial of apportionment violated
the commerce clause through the rationale that the "regular place of
business" test is unconstitutional as a criterion for determining
whether a corporation can apportion its net income. Id. at 321, 182
N.J. Super. at 173-74. The tax court, looking to United States Supreme Court decisions for guidance, noted that a violation of the
commerce clause arises if a state imposes a tax which discriminates
against interstate commerce by subjecting the interstate commerce to
multiple taxation; however, a state formula which fairly apportions
net income for franchise purposes is a valid constitutional means for
burdening interstate commerce with "its fair share of the costs of state
government in return for the benefits it derives from within the state."
Id. at 321-23, 182 N.J. Super. at 174-76 (citations omitted).
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The tax court framed the issue as "whether application of the
'regular place of business' test by New Jersey results in an undue
burden on interstate commerce." Id. at 323, 182 N.J. Super. at 176.
To decide this issue, the court analyzed 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1977), which
states that mere interstate solicitation of sales is not taxable. 3 N.J. Tax
at 323-24, 182 N.J. Super. at 176. Plaintiff reasoned that it had
franchise tax liability to California, Massachusetts and New Jersey,
thereby subjecting itself to the burden of multiple taxation or the
possibility of multiple taxation. Id. at 324, 182 N.J. Super. at 177.
The tax court concluded that both of plaintiff's offices appeared to be
conducting nothing more than non-taxable solicitations and, therefore, the plaintiff failed to prove that the tax imposed an unfair
burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 324-26, 182 N.J. Super. at 17778,
The Rocappi decision, while primarily serving to strengthen the
view that the objective standard will be applied to determine whether
a taxpayer is maintaining a regular place of business outside the state,
also makes clear that when attacking an apportionment formula on
constitutional grounds, plaintiff must affirmatively prove the existence of an unfair burden on interstate commerce.
R.J.W.

